A Behavioral probabilistic risk assessment framework for managing autonomous underwater vehicle deployments by Brito, Mario et al.
This version available at http://nora.nerc.ac.uk/442034/ 
 
 
NERC has developed NORA to enable users to access research outputs 
wholly or partially funded by NERC. Copyright and other rights for material 
on this site are retained by the rights owners. Users should read the terms 
and conditions of use of this material at 
http://nora.nerc.ac.uk/policies.html#access  
 
© Copyright 2012 American Meteorological Society (AMS). 
Permission to use figures, tables, and brief excerpts from this work 
in scientific and educational works is hereby granted provided that 
the source is acknowledged. Any use of material in this work that is 
determined to be “fair use” under Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright 
Act September 2010 Page 2 or that satisfies the conditions 
specified in Section 108 of the U.S. Copyright Act (17 USC §108, as 
revised by P.L. 94-553) does not require the AMS’s permission. 
Republication, systematic reproduction, posting in electronic form, 
such as on a web site or in a searchable database, or other uses of 
this material, except as exempted by the above statement, requires 
written permission or a license from the AMS. Additional details are 
provided in the AMS Copyright Policy, available on the AMS Web 
site located at (http://www.ametsoc.org/) or from the AMS at 617-
227-2425 or copyrights@ametsoc.org. 
 
  
 
 
Article (refereed) – Published version 
 
 
 
Brito, Mario; Griffiths, Gwyn; Ferguson, James; Hopkin, David; Mills, Richard; 
Pederson, Richard; MacNeil, Erin. 2012 A Behavioral probabilistic risk assessment 
framework for managing autonomous underwater vehicle deployments. Journal of 
Atmospheric and Oceanic Technology, 29 (11). 1689-1703. 10.1175/JTECH-D-12-
00005.1  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contact NOC NORA team at  
publications@noc.soton.ac.uk 
 
The NERC and NOC  trademarks and logos (‘the Trademarks’) are registered trademarks of NERC in the UK and other 
countries, and may not be used without the prior written consent of the Trademark owner. 
A Behavioral Probabilistic Risk Assessment Framework for Managing
Autonomous Underwater Vehicle Deployments
MARIO BRITO AND GWYN GRIFFITHS
National Oceanography Centre, Southampton, Hampshire, United Kingdom
JAMES FERGUSON
International Submarine Engineering, Port Coquitlam, British Columbia, Canada
DAVID HOPKIN
Defence R&D Canada–Atlantic, Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, Canada
RICHARD MILLS
International Submarine Engineering, Port Coquitlam, British Columbia, Canada
RICHARD PEDERSON AND ERIN MACNEIL
Defence R&D Canada–Atlantic, Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, Canada
(Manuscript received 21 December 2011, in final form 21 May 2012)
ABSTRACT
The deployment of a deep-diving long-range autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) is a complex operation
that requires the use of a risk-informed decision-making process. Operational risk assessment is heavily de-
pendent on expert subjective judgment. Expert judgments can be elicited eithermathematically or behaviorally.
During mathematical elicitation experts are kept separate and provide their assessment individually. These are
then mathematically combined to create a judgment that represents the group view. The limitation with this
approach is that experts do not have the opportunity to discuss different views and thus remove bias from their
assessment. In this paper, a Bayesian behavioral approach to estimate and manage AUV operational risk is
proposed. At an initial workshop, behavioral aggregation, that is, reaching agreement on the distributions of
risks for faults or incidents, is followed by an agreed upon initial estimate of the likelihood of success of the
proposed risk mitigation methods. Postexpedition, a second workshop assesses the new data and compares
observed to predicted risk, thus updating the prior estimate using Bayes’ rule. This feedback further educates
the experts and assesses the actual effectiveness of the mitigationmeasures. Applying this approach to anAUV
campaign in ice-covered waters in the Arctic showed that the maximum error between the predicted and the
actual risk was 9% and that the experts’ assessments of the effectiveness of risk mitigation led to a maximum of
24% in risk reduction.
1. Introduction
An important category of missions for deep-diving
long-range autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) is
to carry out observations that cannot be conducted by
ships or any other instruments. Unlike smaller AUVs,
these large AUVs typically operate in uncertain envi-
ronments, well beyond acoustic range, for example,
under sea ice (Ferguson et al. 1999) or in complex sea-
bed terrain (McPhail 2009). In the Arctic, gathering in-
formation from beneath sea ice has long had scientific
(Dowdeswell et al. 2008; Nicholls et al. 2006; Jenkins
et al. 2010) and military (Rothrock and Wensnahan
2007) drivers. AUVs are being increasingly used for
polar missions, including for commercial (Kleiner et al.
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2011) and geopolitical purposes. The science community
has recognized that there is a substantial risk of not
completing missions and a risk of losing the vehicle
when operating in polar seas (Griffiths et al. 2003), and it
has developed mathematical methodologies to assess
and manage those risks (Brito et al. 2010). However,
when AUVs are to be used for data gathering in support
of geopolitical or commercial missions, the risks of not
completing missions or campaigns are likely to have
greater impact and repercussions than for science mis-
sions. Consequently, the risk analysis and management
processes need to be more robust, transparent, and de-
fensible.
This paper proposes extending the framework devised
previously for risk management of scientific AUV mis-
sions (Griffiths and Trembanis 2007). The motivation
came from the decision by the Canadian Government,
acting through Natural Resources Canada (NRCan), to
use AUVs as part of its data-gathering program in the
Arctic in support of its United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) submission (Crees et al.
2010). Article 76 allows countries to extend their juris-
diction beyond 200 nmi from the baselines if it is dem-
onstrated that the seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas are ‘‘a natural prolongation of its land territory
to the outer edge of the continental margin’’ (United
Nations Oceans and Law of the Sea 2011). Countries
that aim to extend the territorial state beyond 200 nmi
must provide evidence, based on detailed mapping of
the seabed, that the seafloor is an extension of their
continental shelf. Given the importance of the dataset,
the cost of operations in the high Arctic, and the limited
season, credible AUV risk management was required.
In the Griffiths and Trembanis (2007) framework risk
management is informed by assessments provided by a
group of experts, where the final assessment is one that
represents the group judgment. Individual expert judg-
ments can be aggregated mathematically or behaviorally
to reach this group judgment. Previously, expert judg-
ments have been mathematically aggregated using the
linear opinion pool, where experts have been kept sepa-
rate during the elicitation (Clemen and Winkler 1999;
Griffiths et al. 2009; Brito et al. 2010). There are different
schools of thought as to what is the best aggregation
method; while some postulate the use of mathematical
methods (e.g.,Mosleh et al. 1987) others postulate the use
of behavioral methods (e.g., Phillips 1999). Mathematical
methods should be applied together with substantial
calibration and sensitivity studies; the latter are needed
to assess the impact of different methods and biases
(Keeney and von Winterfeldt 1989; Winkler 1967).
In previous AUV risk assessments, for particular faults
or incidents, experts provided judgments of a probability
of fault leading to loss that spanned three orders of
magnitude (Brito et al. 2010). Despite capturing each
expert’s estimate of uncertainty using quartiles, the large
spread for some assessments remained a concern. It was
not feasible to establish whether this spread reflected true
uncertainty, or whether the experts’ own specific experi-
ence or knowledge that was drawn upon to justify their
assessments could withstand peer review. To deal with
this potential bias issue, experts’ judgments were aggre-
gated mathematically into two separate groups, termed
optimists and pessimists. It was left to the decision maker
to decide which risk assessment to use.
For the last 60 yr there has been a flood of psycho-
logical experiments dealing with various aspects of man
as an intuitive statistician (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman
1974; Kynn 2008). In probability assessment, bias may
take many forms. Sources of biases are classified as
motivational or cognitive; both are a result of conscious
or subconscious adjustments in the experts’ assessments.
Motivational biases are introduced because the expert is
motivated by his or her perceived personal rewards or
concerns for various assessments. Cognitive bias may
result from the use of particular modes of judgment, also
denoted as mental shortcuts or heuristics. A number of
heuristics have been identified, and themost well known
are availability, adjustment or anchoring, and repre-
sentativeness. In availability heuristics the probability
assessment is based on the information that the expert
either recalls or visualizes, with little attention to the
specific details of the present circumstances. With ad-
justment and anchoring heuristics the most readily
available information forms the initial basis for the as-
sessment, and subsequent assessments result in adjust-
ments from this basis. In representativeness heuristics
the probability of an event is evaluated according to the
degree to which it is considered representative of a pop-
ulation from which it has originated.
One way to reduce bias in expert assessments is by
conducting a behavioral judgment elicitation.Here experts
are kept in the same room, they debate their views on
a particular fault or incident prior to the assessment of risk,
and at the end they agree on a single risk distribution that
represents the group’s consensual assessment (O’Hagan
et al. 2006). In most cases, experts may have specialized
knowledge in particular fields. The interaction between
experts has been shown to provide a better synthesis
through their collective expertise (Spetzler and Sael von
Holstein 1975).
In this paper we propose a behavioral risk assessment
approach for creating a risk profile of an autonomous
underwater vehicle in extreme environments. The
framework, influenced by Bayesian concepts, allows for
the risk assessment to be revisited postcampaign to (a)
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assess the outcomes against predictions and (b) provide
feedback to improve the collective knowledge of the
experts. Bayesian concepts are used by the experts for
computing a posteriori probability of loss based on the
experts’ assessments of the actual mission results. Here,
the a posteriori is not calculated as a function of the
product of the likelihood and the a priori, which can be
implemented in a mathematical algorithm. The Bayes-
ian concept is implicit in the experts’ assessments as they
estimate the a posterior in light of the campaign results
and their previous assessments.
For autonomous underwater vehicles operational risk
can be mitigated in two different ways; one way is by the
introduction of a monitoring distance. A monitoring
distance is particularly effective for long-range vehicles,
where the vehicle is monitored for a certain amount of
time while within acoustic range before committing to
the mission (Brito et al. 2010). A second way to mitigate
the operational risk is by removing the most significant
risks out of the operational profile. These can be either
hardware or software faults or human operator error.
While the design phase of an AUV will have sought to
reduce significant risks, faults inevitably emerge during
testing and use. Previous AUV risk assessment exercises
considered that a fault or risk was either mitigated or
not mitigated; it was assumed that the design team was
certain over each outcome (Griffiths et al. 2003).However,
inmost cases there is uncertainty over this assessment. For
example, the design team may not have sufficient time to
test a new component, system, or modification, or perhaps
the failure’s root cause has not been fully understood.
Consequently, this paper presents an approach for up-
dating the AUV risk profile based on the experts’ prob-
ability assessments on the effectiveness of risk mitigation
procedures.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 outlines
the behavioral risk assessment process followed by a
summary of the fault history considered by the experts
for the motivating example in section 3. Section 4 pres-
ents the results of this risk assessment exercise; derivation
of the survival estimator used for creating the AUV risk
profile forms section 5, which is then applied in section 6
to calculate the AUV operational risk for a set of under–
sea ice missions in the Arctic. Original and observed
mitigation effectiveness is compared in section 7, and
section 8 presents our conclusions.
2. Behavioral expert judgment elicitation
The interpretation of risk can vary from application to
application (Kaplan and Garrick 1981). For example,
within the subject of oceanic and atmospheric technol-
ogy, when Dance et al. (2010) attempt to quantify the
probability of thunderstorm strike, risk is defined by the
following two quantities: the scenario (thunderstorm)
and the probability of occurrence. The consequence of
a thunderstorm is not considered. On the other hand,
Changnon (1999), attempting to quantify the risk of hail
in the United States, considered the following three
properties: the scenario (hail), the probability of hail in
different areas, and the financial costs caused by hail. To
avoid any ambiguity we shall now present the definition
of risk used in this paper. Two different interpretations
are considered—one for a static risk model and a second
for a dynamic risk model. For the static risk model,
formed by the faults and the experts assessments, risk is
defined by the duplet (S, Li), where S is the scenario, in
this case AUV loss, and Li is the subjective probability
of a fault (F) leading to loss in a given environment (E),
that is, P(LjF, E). For the dynamic risk model, risk re-
mains defined by the duplet (S, Li), while S remains the
same; Li is now the probability of loss given a specific
distance (d), P(LjF, E, d) (Brito et al. 2010). The fol-
lowing subsections provide details of the risk assessment
conducted for creating the static risk model.
a. Fault risk assessment
A number of expert judgment behavioral aggregation
methods have been published in academic journals and
research reports. The Delphi method (Dalkey 1969) is
arguably the most referenced, but other approaches,
such as the nominal group technique (Delbecq et al.
1975), the aggregationmethod of Kaplan (Kaplan 1990),
and the Sheffield Elicitation Framework (SHELF)
method (O’Hagan et al. 2006), are also widely referenced
and applied. Thesemethods vary in the form of interaction
between experts and facilitators (face to face, mediated by
a computer, or anonymously). Time is always at a pre-
mium in expert judgment elicitations. Because the aim in
this instance was to assess the risk posed by a number of
faults, a method that can be applied within an acceptable
time limit while maximizing the amount of discussion be-
tween experts was adopted by following the SHELF pro-
posed by O’Hagan et al. (2006).
The aim of the elicitation was to estimate the proba-
bility of a fault leading to loss in the given target envi-
ronment. It is well accepted that experts will not always
agree on a particular risk assessment, and this may result
in differences in the experts’ assessments. The SHELF
elicitation process defines means for capturing these in
a probability distribution. This rationale was pioneered
by Phillips and Wisbey (1993) and further developed by
O’Hagan (1998). Experts were asked to define the dis-
tribution using five parameters: the lower and upper
bounds (denoted as L and U, respectively), median M,
and lower and upper quartiles (denoted as LQ and UQ,
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respectively). Experts were given training on probability
assessment and on the concept of subjective probability
and Bayesian theory. The steps of the behavioral expert
judgment elicitation exercise are set out in the appendix.
b. Effectiveness of the mitigation assessment
Risk mitigation of operational faults can be achieved
by introducing design changes or new operational pro-
cedures. Over the years organizations concerned about
risk have developed processes, mostly simulation based,
for assessing the impact of risk mitigations. For example,
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) developed theDefectDetection and Prevention
(DDP) system for aiding decision making during the
early phase of technology and system development
(Feather and Cornford 2003). The DDP uses the assess-
ment of the effectiveness of a risk mitigation strategy for
updating the risk outcome of a defect. Here effectiveness
of risk mitigation is used for addressing the reliability of
the design. To our knowledge, no framework has been
proposed for updating operational risk estimation based
on the estimated effectiveness of risk mitigation strategies.
Risk mitigation procedures are not guaranteed to be
successful, for example, the implementation might not be
as simple as initially envisaged or time for operational
testing may be too short. Expert assessment presents the
formalism for quantifying the effectiveness of these pro-
cedures. The expert panel was asked to agree on the
probability that the mitigation plan proposed by the de-
sign team would completely remove the fault. This as-
sessment followed the risk elicitation described above,
and it lasted approximately 5 h. The experts’ assessments
for the mitigation strategies were based on the infor-
mation available. This was provided by two design and
operational engineers who also attended the workshop.
Following a debate, experts were asked to agree on
the assessment, assigning pMi 5 0 if the consensus was
that the proposed risk mitigation would not mitigate the
fault, pMi 5 1 if the consensus was that the proposed
mitigation would completely mitigate the fault, or an
intermediate value. Having estimated the effectiveness
of the mitigation strategy the static risk model can be
updated using the following:
P(Li jFi, E,Mi)5P(Li jFi, E)(12PM
i
) , (1)
whereP(LijFi,E,Mi) is the probability of loss given fault
Fi, environment E, and mitigation strategy Mi. From
this equation it is possible to see that if pMi 5 1, then
P(LijFi, E, Mi) 5 0 for fault Fi. Experts’ assessments
for pMi for all faults in the motivating example are pre-
sented in Table 1.
3. Motivating example: Explorer AUV fault
history
Two Explorer class AUVs were delivered to NRCan
for the 2010 Arctic campaign, both of which had been
built by International Submarine Engineering (ISE;
Crees et al. 2010). Only vehicle 5’s data are used in this
paper, vehicle 6 had too few runs for the statistics to be
meaningful. Careful records had been kept of the 51
faults and incidents that emerged during the following
five testing phases:
1) fabrication and assembly (May–September 2009), in
which five faults emerged;
2) sea trials (8 September–12 October 2009), with 19
faults;
3) first homing and positioning trials (16 November–
4 December 2009), with 14 faults;
4) second homing and positioning trials (14 January–
28 February 2010), with 8 faults; and
5) mission testing (22 February–12 March 2010), with 5
faults.
The record for each fault or incident contained a de-
scription of the depth, if at sea; the time into themission;
the action taken by the AUV; a note on the possible
impact, if the fault had happened under ice; the corrective
action taken, or to be taken; and further comments where
applicable. In addition, the phase of the mission de-
ployment when the fault occurred was included to
allow for state transition analysis, following the methods
described in Brito and Griffiths (2011).
Taking broad categories, the top five types of failures
were software (25%), maneuvering (16%), navigation
(13%), control electronics (9%), and communications
(7%). Payload, ballast, electrical, and homing each had
approximately 5%; energy, electrical cabling, propulsion,
and collision avoidance each had approximately 2%.
4. Outcomes of behavioral aggregation:
Precampaign
This section illustrates and discusses the wide range of
behavioral aggregation outcomes, from quickly reached
unanimity to judgments with wide spans indicative of
agreements to disagree. The aggregated outcomes are
listed in Table 1, as the five parameters elicited, the 95%
quantile obtained from fitting a beta distribution to the
parameters, and the time into the mission the fault oc-
curred. In practical terms, a risk-informed decision should
not be based on themean ormedian. The reason for this is
because of the level of uncertainty associated with these
estimates, which in the case of the median is 50%. As
described in section 6 of this paper, in order to calculate
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AUV survival with distance, the agreed expert judgment
must be integratedwith a statistical survival estimator.We
decided to use the 95%quantile of the agreed distribution
because it reduces the amount of uncertainty that wemust
take into account in the final survival calculation.
One intrinsic part of the Bayesian elicitation process is
that experts update their assessments based on argu-
ments presented by other experts. In some cases the
most conservative expert changes his assessments to
agree with the most optimistic expert. For some other
TABLE 1. Aggregated expert judgments for the 51 faults that emerged prior to the Arctic campaign.
Fault Mission L LQ M UQ U
95%
quantile Time (h)
Probability of
mitigation
1 Assembly_1 1.0 3 1025 2.73 3 1025 4.0 3 1025 0.000 208 0.001 0.000 413 0 0
2 Assembly_2 0 1.68 3 1028 6.2 3 1028 2.3 3 1027 1.0 3 1026 6.43 3 1027 0 0.9
3 Assembly_3 0.0002 0.001 77 0.005 0.0234 0.1 5.36 3 1022 0 0.8
4 Assembly_4 0 1.68 3 1028 6.2 3 1028 2.3 3 1027 1.0 3 1026 6.43 3 1027 0 0.9
5 Assembly_5 0 1.68 3 1028 6.2 3 1028 2.3 3 1027 1.0 3 1026 6.43 3 1027 0 0.95
6 2_1 0 1.68 3 1028 6.2 3 1028 2.3 3 1027 1.0 3 1026 6.43 3 1027 6 h, 52 min 1
7 4_1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 h, 29 min 1
8 4_2 0.1 0.176 0.216 0.4 0.5 0.48 5 h, 29 min 0.9
9 6_1 0.0001 0.000 87 0.001 46 0.0032 0.005 0.004 64 4 h, 10 min 0.1
10 6_2 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 h, 10 min 0.95
11 6_3 0 1.68 3 1028 6.2 3 1028 2.3 3 1027 1.0 3 1026 6.43 3 1027 4 h, 10 min 0.95
12 4_3 0.01 0.0487 0.134 0.28 0.75 0.504 5 h, 29 min 1
13 5_1 0.001 0.0046 0.013 0.0207 0.04 0.0362 3 h, 56 min 0.8
14 6_4 0.05 0.3 0.63 0.805 0.95 0.921 4 h, 10 min 0.75
15 6_5 0.1 0.363 0.546 0.73 1 0.901 4 h, 10 min 0.4
16 7_1 0.01 0.059 0.14 0.218 0.5 0.397 5 h, 42 min 0.95
17 8_1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 h, 55 min 0
18 9_1 0.001 0.001 35 0.003 0.0093 0.05 0.0166 4 h, 56 min 0.9
19 10_1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 h, 13 min 0.8
20 10_2 0.5 0.6 0.68 0.75 0.8 0.79 5 h, 13 min 0.4
21 18_1 0.001 0.0046 0.013 0.0207 0.04 0.0361 5 h, 51 min 0.8
22 18_2 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 h, 51 min 0
23 21_1 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 h, 43 min 0.9
24 17_1 0.001 0.0046 0.013 0.0207 0.04 0.0361 5 h, 16 min 0.95
25 23_1 0.02 0.052 0.08 0.111 0.2 0.167 4 h, 47 min 0.95
26 24_1 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 h, 39 min 0.9
27 24_2 0.001 0.0122 0.0458 0.077 0.2 0.176 10 h, 39 min 0.8
28 25_1 0.001 0.0046 0.013 0.0207 0.04 0.0361 8 h, 5 min 0.95
29 25_2 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 h, 5 min 1
30 25_3 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 h, 5 min 1
31 27_1 0.001 0.0018 0.0035 0.006 22 0.01 0.009 83 4 h, 17 min 0.9
32 27_2 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 h, 17 min 1
33 27_3 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 h, 17 min 0.6
34 28_1 0.4 0.49 0.61 0.7 0.8 0.798 3 h, 55 min 0.9
35 29_1 0.0001 0.000 87 0.001 46 0.0032 0.005 0.004 64 7 h, 28 min 0.1
36 31_1 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 h, 36 min 1
37 32_1 0.0004 0.004 0.012 0.048 0.2 0.109 7 h, 40 min 0.75
38 33_1 0.0004 0.0049 0.03 0.078 0.3 0.202 8 h, 2 min 0.5
39 35_1 0.001 0.004 0.01 0.0147 0.02 0.0189 5 h, 42 min 0.5
40 36_1 0.001 0.004 0.007 67 0.0117 0.02 0.0197 5 h, 21 min 0.5
41 36_2 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 h, 21 min 0.5
42 37_1 0.001 0.004 0.007 67 0.0117 0.02 0.0197 6 h, 7 min 0.5
43 38_1 0.001 0.005 67 0.0107 0.0157 0.02 0.0191 9 h, 29 min 0
44 40_1 1.0 3 1025 2.33 3 1025 4.67 3 1025 7.33 3 1025 0.0001 0.0009 5 h, 16 min 0.5
45 45_1 0.1 0.333 0.533 0.7 0.8 0.78 8 h 0.5
46 45_2 0.001 0.0393 0.163 0.257 0.5 0.451 8 h 0.5
47 46_1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 h, 10 min 0.5
48 48_1 0.001 0.0046 0.013 0.0207 0.04 0.0361 62 h 0.95
49 49_1 0.1 0.333 0.533 0.7 0.8 0.78 4 h 0.5
50 50_1 0.1 0.333 0.533 0.7 0.8 0.78 60 h 0.5
51 50_2 0.001 0.003 17 0.005 33 0.007 33 0.01 0.009 47 60 h 0.1
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experts’ assessments we may see the opposite. This de-
pends on the robustness of the arguments presented by
each expert. Therefore, the 95% quantile of the agreed
probability of loss distribution is not the result of the
assessment provided by the most conservative expert.
a. Unanimity on faults that would inevitably lead to
loss under ice
For five faults (10, 22, 33, 41, and 47) the experts
concluded that there would be certain loss under ice, and
set all parameters of the distribution to 1. Fault 10 was
a time delay relay (TDR) malfunction. Based on the
evidence that the vehicle had to be recovered as a ‘‘dead
vehicle,’’ the experts agreed that if this fault occurred
during an under-ice mission, more than 300 m away from
an ice hole [the recovery remotely operated underwater
vehicle (ROV) operating radius], then it would lead to
certain vehicle loss. Faults that lead to the vehicle coming
to a complete stop were considered to lead to certain loss.
Fault 22 was a vehicle control computer (VCC) configu-
ration fault that caused the vehicle to exit AUV mode
and enter the stopmode for no apparent reason while the
vehicle was in the water. No cause could be identified,
but one of the experts (an Explorer user) had experi-
enced a similar fault previously.Amission-planning error
(fault 33) caused the vehicle to time out and stop. An
unexpected release of the drop weight, for no apparent
reason (faults 41 and 47), was also considered as leading
to certain loss. This conclusion was reached quickly, but
was followed by a long discussion on the possible causes
as an aid to finding a mitigation strategy.
b. Unanimity on faults that would have no impact at
all on survivability
For nine faults (7, 17, 19, 23, 26, 29, 30, 32, and 36) the
collective conclusion was that there was zero probability
of the faults leading to loss. In some cases this was be-
cause the component or subsystem that suffered the
fault would not be present for the Arctic missions. This
was the case for faults 7 (GPS antenna) and 17 (a VCC
reboot when a radio modem connection is established).
In another case it was because the fault occurred when
the operating environment was so dissimilar to the
ocean or the Arctic. Fault 19, a drop weight release
failure on deck resulting from salt encrustation, would
not have happened when in the water.
c. Faults where the phase of the mission may affect the
consequence
A class of faults, typified by fault 14, a failure by the
VCC to mount the hard drive at boot time, resulted in
vigorous discussion by the experts on the probability of
loss, because some experts considered the outcome to be
strongly dependent on the phase of the mission during
which the fault occurred. In this example, there were
different views of the combination of this failure to
mount the hard drive with the VCC’s ability to restart,
regain the mission, or return home, compounded with
the unknown technical issues that caused the reboot in
the first place. Consequently, the aggregated judgment
arrived at through discussion showed a large span be-
tween a lower limit of 0.05 and an upper limit of 0.95.
d. Faults where individual experts shared particular
insights affecting the aggregated outcome
A mistake in setting the VCC configuration (fault 12)
gave the wrong sign to the attitude sensor’s pitch rate,
resulting in the vehicle porpoising on the surface. In-
dividual experts gave different weighting in their con-
siderations to possible extra power consumption from
porpoising, thus depleting the battery supply, to possible
impact with the bottom in shallow water or at low alti-
tudes, and considered the unknown amplitude of the
pitch oscillations from the fault. The resulting distribu-
tion with a lower limit of 0.01 and an upper limit of 0.75
reflected the experts’ views on the range of behaviors
that this fault could engender.
e. Agreement that the fault leads to a wide range of
probability of loss
Fault 46 (a problem with a forward plane) was given
agreed assessments that spanned three orders of mag-
nitude. This wide range was not due to the need to en-
compass experts’ disagreements but to their uncertainty
concerning the outcome of the failure scenario, even
after extensive discussion. For fault 46 they found it
difficult to assess the risk without more information on
vehicle performance following a single plane failure.
Experts concluded that the risk distribution had to en-
compass a low risk tail, for the case where the failed
plane would feather and control could be maintained
using the functional planes, and a higher risk for when
the plane stuck at an extreme angle, causing much
higher drag and affecting control severely.
This was in contrast to those faults (13, 21, 24, 28, and
48) where it was clear that the planes failed into a feather
configuration, for which the experts agreed quickly on
a narrower, lower risk distribution.
f. Insights into instances of where a fault implied
a consequential vulnerability
Discussion between the experts on consequential
vulnerabilities arising from some faults proved valuable.
Through discussion they were able to see beyond the
immediate fault. For example, in fault 20 the Photonic
Inertial Navigation System (PHINS) serial input failed
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to accept inputs from the Doppler velocity log (DVL),
GPS, and depth sensor. Nevertheless, the PHINS con-
tinued to provide position information. While internally
the PHINS reported degraded performance there was
no alarm to indicate this to theVCC.As a result, this was
a nondetectable fault by the vehicle. The experts’ dis-
cussions focused on the impact that the distance be-
tween the AUV when the fault occurred and the
recovery point would have on the fault consequence.
Experts argued whether the distance between AUV and
the recovery point was sufficient for the induced error to
exceed the range of the homing system, before con-
cluding that this was a critical fault, with a lower limit of
loss of 0.5 and an upper limit of 0.8.
g. Agreement to use heuristic shortcuts
Working as a group, the experts agreed collectively
that they would spend little time on those faults that had
a very low, but nonzero, consequence for the risk of loss.
For these, they agreed on a standard distribution with
a lower limit of 0, a median of 6.2 3 1028, and an upper
limit of 1026. Examples are the two Network Time
Protocol server failures (faults 2 and 11) because they
only affected data logging, not command, control, or
navigation, and internal problems with the acoustic
survey instruments, again not influencing control (faults
4, 5, and 6). The small probabilities were considered to
account for unimagined consequences.
5. Outcomes of mitigation assessments:
Precampaign
The experts’ collectively agreed probabilities of suc-
cessful mitigation for the 51 faults presented as a histo-
gram (Fig. 1) shows three separate distributions. One,
with amode at zero, represents those faults for which the
experts agreed that the cause of the fault was unknown
or unproven (such as for fault 22 described earlier),
where there was no disagreement with the Explorer
engineers. This distribution also covered faults where
the experts were unconvinced that the proposed miti-
gation strategy would prove effective. This was the case
for fault 24, where the database of controller parameters
and configuration settings became corrupted. Despite
changes to data management protocols, the fault re-
curred, and a further fix had been conceived but not
tested.
The second distribution, with a sharp mode at 0.5,
represents those faults the experts considered for which,
although the proposed solution was appropriate, the
mitigation strategy had not been sufficiently tested or
proven in field trials, or where a recurrence of a similar
fault could not be ruled out. As an example of the
former, fault 20 with the PHINS navigation unit re-
sulted in the unit being sent back to the manufacturer,
a new motherboard and upgraded software was in-
stalled. However, because the unit was not tested,
confidence in a true fix was not high. Instances of a fault
where the particular occurrence was fixed, but there
could be no guarantee that the fault, or a very similar
fault, would not recur, were typified by human error or
oversight. For example, fault 46, caused by a loose
washer within a forward-plane controller. Software
configuration faults can also fall into this class, such as
fault 41, where the unintended consequence of a soft-
ware change made prior to the mission changed a fault
priority that resulted in the AUV stopping rather than
continuing. Experts considered human error could oc-
cur again with configuration settings.
The third distribution of probability of successful
mitigation has a mode at over 0.9, indicating a high to
very high level of confidence by the experts that the
causes of faults were well understood, and that the
solutions were known and tested. How well the solu-
tions were tested affected the judgment; for example,
for fault 13, the hydroplane not rotating correctly,
resulting from an incorrect gauge in the locking washer,
was assigned a mitigation probability of 0.8, which
would increase with subsequent in-water trials with
a washer of heavier gauge material. Certain success
for mitigation, retiring the faults completely, was the
FIG. 1. Histogram of the assignments of probability of successful
mitigation for the 51 faults, showing three distinct distributions.
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agreed outcome for those cases, such as faults 7 and 33,
where the components or subsystems concerned would
not be present for the Arctic missions. Also certain of
mitigation were faults such as 12 (the incorrect sign
of the PHINS pitch rate), where the cause was fully
understood, straightforward, and a solution was im-
plemented and tested. Some room for doubt, with a
probability of success of 0.95, was assigned to those
faults, while well understood and corrected could,
with a small probability, recur. For example, fault 11, a
missing battery in the network time protocol server
was a human error, easily corrected, but with a non-
zero chance of being repeated.
Combining the assessments on P(LjF, E) with PM
identifies those faults where P(LjF, E) is high but PM is
low. These form an important subset for the engineers
to address. Most critical was fault 22, the VCC con-
figuration problem, where P(LjF, E) was 1 and PM
was 0. For all other faults where PM was less than 0.1,
P(LjF, E) was less than 0.01 (Table 1); consequently,
the need for effort into improving the understanding of
the mitigation required was far less important. Of the
14 faults where 0.4, PM, 0.6 eight were assessed with
P(LjF, E). 0.5 (Table 1). This was the most important
set of faults for further investigation and improvement
in PM.
6. Survival estimator and confidence limits
The survival distribution for the ISE Explorer AUV
was created using the extended version proposed by
Brito et al. (2010) of the well-established Kaplan–Meier
nonparametric model for estimating and displaying
survival functions for small to medium samples of data.
The estimator was first introduced by Kaplan andMeier
(1958). Since then it has been applied in a wide variety of
fields from medical statistics to systems failure analysis
(Prentice and Kalbfleisch 2002). In failure analysis, the
method uses historical data to compute systems survival
as function of time. The historical data consist of failure
time data and times of failure-free operations. The sur-
vival function is computed from the product of these two
sources of data. The estimator uses a censor flag to
specify whether at a given time it is considering failure
data or survival data (nonfailure). In previous work we
have shown that if the censor flag is replaced by prob-
ability of loss given that failure Fi emerges in environ-
ment E, allow us to calculate system survival for a given
environment, this formulation is presented in Eq. (2).
For autonomous underwater vehicles we use distance
instead of time as distance is proportional to time. Given
a set of data comprising ordered mission ranges and
whether each mission ended with a fault that has a
probability of leading to loss [P(L j Fi, E)], the survivor
function S(r) with range r is defined as
S(r)5P
r
i
,r

12
1
ni
P(L j Fi,E)

, (2)
where ni is the number (of missions) at risk immediately
prior to range ri and is the number of losses at range r.
Thus, the survival dataset will include all fault assess-
ments, the distances at which they took place, and also
all fault-free missions (Table 2).
In the general case, the confidence limits for the ex-
tended Kaplan–Meier estimator are deduced from the
variance in the dataset and the variance in the expert
judgments (Brito et al. 2010). However, for this risk
assessment, which considers the 95% quantile of the
expert judgments obtained from fitting a beta distribu-
tion to the five parameters elicited from the experts
(Table 1) and not the mean, the variance in the experts’
assessments can be ignored. The 95% confidence limits
for the estimator then becomes
expf2exp[c1(r)]g, S^(r), expf2exp[c2(r)]g , (3)
where
c6(r)5 log[2logS^(r)]6 za/2
ffiffiffiffi^
V
p
, (4)
and where za/2 is the upper a/2 point of the standard
normal distribution; the 5% point was used, which is
1.96.
TABLE 2. Fault-free missions prior to the Arctic campaign. Vehicle
is assumed to travel at a speed of 1.5 m s21.
Mission Time Distance (km)
3 5 h, 17 min 28.5
11 13 h, 56 min 75.2
12 3 h, 29 min 18.8
13 4 h, 35 min 24.8
14 5 h, 53 min 31.8
15 5 h, 6 min 27.5
16 26 min 2.3
19 6 h, 4 min 32.8
20 6 h, 15 min 33.8
22 5 h, 28 min 29.5
26 11 h, 50 min 63.9
30 6 h, 32 min 35.3
34 5 h, 30 min 29.7
39 6 h, 42 min 36.2
41 9 h, 13 min 49.8
42 3 h, 43 min 20.1
43 6 h, 14 min 33.7
44 5 h, 12 min 28.1
47 5 h, 56 min 37.4
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The variance is calculated using
VKM5
1
log[S(r)2]

r
i
,r
pi
ni(ni2 pi)
. (5)
The survival distributions for theExplorerAUV (Fig. 2)
show the probability of survival against distance without,
and with, mitigation of faults for a singlemission. Thus, for
a 200-km mission without considering the effectiveness of
mitigation strategies the probability of survival would be
0.7, increasing to 0.85 when the mitigation measures and
their assessed effectiveness were taken into account. That
is, the risk of loss is halved on this single mission. These
estimates are without considering the use of a monitoring
distance for further risk mitigation (Brito et al. 2010).
7. A priori campaign risk prediction
There were four types of missions planned for in the
Arctic in 2010 as follows:
1) proving missions around the main camp ice hole
(missions 51, 52, and 53);
(a) a round-trip dive from the main camp to the
southwest with the entire payload active (mis-
sion 51),
(b) a transit out to approximately 56 km before re-
turning back to the main camp using the short-
range localization (SRL) system with no sensors
active (mission 52), and
(c) a 131-km round-trip mission out to a beacon
camp to test the long-range homing system
(mission 53);
2) one-way transit mission from the main camp to the
remote camp (mission 54);
3) a survey of identified features of interest along the
continental shelf (mission 55); and
4) one-way transit mission from the remote camp to the
main camp (mission 56).
The missions’ distances covered by the vehicle during
the Arctic mission were different from those specified
prior to the campaign. Consequently, in order to com-
pare similar quantities, we use the prior risk model to
estimate the mission risk of the actual mission distances
instead of the planned mission distances. See Table 3 for
details.
Brito et al. (2010) showed how monitoring an AUV
for a distance d, over which the vehicle could be re-
covered if a fault developed, could increase the proba-
bility of survival over the actual mission distance R. Let
the probability of loss for the monitoring distance be
P(d) and the probability of loss for the mission range
be P(R), then the conditional probability expression
leads to
P(X,R jX.d)5P(X5R)2P(X5d)
12P(X5 d)
, (6)
where P(X , RjX . d) is the probability of loss for
target mission range R given that the vehicle has sur-
vived monitoring distance d. Expression (6) can be de-
rived by manipulating the joint probability function of
two statistically dependent events in which P(X , R,
X. d)5 P(X, RjX. d) 3 P(X. d), where the term
on the left-hand side equals P(X 5 R) 2 P(X 5 d).
The probability of loss for distance greater than d is
P(X. d)5 12 P(X5 d). The probability of survival is
the complement of the probability of loss. If we denote
FIG. 2. (a) Kaplan–Meier probability of survival against distance
for the dataset as considered by the experts with no mitigation of
the individual faults and (b) with the assessment of individual fault
mitigation included.
TABLE 3. All missions during the Arctic campaign, missions 53
and 55, were fault free. Vehicle is assumed to travel at a speed of
1.5 m s21.
Mission Time Distance (km)
51 5 h, 39 min 30.51
52 10 h, 20 min 55.8
53 24 h, 18 min 131.22
54 62 h, 16 min 336.24
55 60 h, 22 min 325.98
56 60 h, 5 min 324.45
NOVEMBER 2012 BR I TO ET AL . 1697
the probability of survival as S, then S(X 5 d) 5 1 2
P(X 5 d).
The choice of the distance d is informedby theKaplan–
Meier plots in Fig. 2, balancing a sufficient distance to
enable those faults that have historically emerged at short
distances against the increasing overhead of choosing a
larger distance.
a. Proving missions around the main camp ice hole
In the initial analysis, we considered a monitoring dis-
tance of 20 km. However, in the actual deployment the
monitoring distance was 31 km (for which the probability
of survival is 0.9042); this was, in fact, mission 51.
For mission 52 the probability of survival becomes
unmitigated: P(surv) 5 0.722,
mitigated: P(surv) 5 0.860, and
mitigated 1 monitor 31 km: P(surv) 5 0.96;
and for mission 53
unmitigated: P(surv) 5 0.704,
mitigated: P(surv) 5 0.856, and
mitigated 1 monitor 31 km: P(surv) 5 0.947.
b. The survey missions
The product rule can be used to get at the overall
probability of surviving three such missions. The overall
P(survival) is simply the product of the individual
probabilities,
P(surv)5P
n
i51
P(surv)i . (7)
Hence, for this example set of three missions, overall,
unmitigated: P(surv) 5 p1(d 5 324 km) 3 p2(d 5
326 km) 3 p3(d 5 336 km)
0.704 3 0.518 3 0.50 5 0.182,
mitigated: P(surv) 5 p1(d 5 324 km) 3 p2(d 5
326 km) 3 p3(d 5 336 km)
0.856 3 0.741 3 0.74 5 0.469, and
mitigated 1 monitor 31 km:
P(surv) 5 p1(d 5 324 km) 3 p2(d 5 326 km) 3
p3(d 5 336 km)
0.946 3 0.82 3 0.819 5 0.635.
8. Postcampaign risk assessment
In the previous section we used the extended version of
the Kaplan–Meier estimator to quantify the probability
of survival with distance predicted from the prior history
of faults and incidents. In this section we compare this
prediction with the probability of survival derived using
exactly the same methodology, but based only on the
faults and incidents observed during the deployment. At
a second risk assessment workshop the criticality of 17
faults that emerged during the 2010 Arctic campaign
were assessed. These faults fell into the categories of
control and electronics (17%); navigation (17%); payload
(17%); software (12%); and ballast, communications,
electrical and cabling, and mission planning (6%) each.
a. Expert judgments on emerged faults
During the expert judgment elicitation a similar pat-
tern to that observed in the first workshop was seen. For
some faults, experts quickly reached an agreement, for
others a longer debate was required.
For five faults, experts assigned zero to all parameters
of the probability of loss distribution. These consisted
mainly of payload faults, where experts considered that
while these would have an impact on science data gath-
ering, they would pose no risk to the vehicle’s safety.
Also in this category was fault 3, a VCC configuration
fault that meant that engineers could not put the vehicle
intomissionmode acoustically. This was fixed at the time
of the deployment by increasing the telemetry item size
in the configuration file. Experts considered this real-
time fix to be an important factor, certain of correcting
the problem.
In the previous workshop, experts identified a class of
faults that had low impact. For these faults they agreed on
a probability of loss distribution that was low but non-
zero. In this assessment experts did not explicitly reach
such an agreement and distribution for this type of fault.
Nevertheless, the assessments for faults 12 and 15 showed
that such distributions were used in this workshop un-
consciously rather than through deliberate agreement.
Fault 1, a ground fault on the variable ballasting system,
was also considered low impact, but here expertswere not
so quick to reach agreement.
The agreed distributions for other faults fell into one of
three shapes. First are the distributions that were skewed
to the left (low probability), with a long tail toward high
probability. Experts agreed on such distribution for faults,
2, 8, 9, 10, and 16. These are in general faults that would
not result in immediate vehicle loss but would degrade the
vehicle’s safety with time. For example, fault 2, a CTD
sensor failure, resulted from a crack on the sensor that
could lead to degraded sonar data with a possible conse-
quential degradation of navigation accuracy. The same
rationale was adopted for fault 8, a bottom-avoidance
altimeter ground fault, and fault 9, a Mimosa (mission
planning software) distance estimation inaccuracy. Fault
10 was a VCC configuration failure that resulted in an
under-depth fault response during the mission. Fault 16
1698 JOURNAL OF ATMOSPHER IC AND OCEAN IC TECHNOLOGY VOLUME 29
was a lower transducer failure at the end of the Arctic
mission at themain camp, just before recovery. The upper
bound for all of these distributionswas assigned to capture
the most critical consequence.
Second, the distribution for fault 4 is skewed to the
right, but here experts agreed that the whole distribution
should be defined by high probability values. Fault 4 was
a VCC configuration fault, where the VCC was config-
ured so that the PHINS was power cycled when the ACE
restarts. This would cause loss of PHINS alignment with
every VCC reboot. Given the high likelihood of a reboot,
experts considered that the probability of loss should be
high, because PHINS alignment is a lengthy process at
high latitudes.
Finally, there are the normally distributed expert
judgments. This is the case for faults 6, 7, and 17. Of
these, two were ground faults in critical components.
Fault 6 was an acoustic modem ground fault, and fault 7
was a main bus 48-V ground fault. Fault 17 was a com-
munications fault, with no acoustic command at the
remote camp. The lower bound may be justified by the
fact that these faults did not result in vehicle loss during
the deployment; the vehicle was still capable of finding
its way to the recovery point. The upper bound reflects
the fact that these faults, if compounded with other
failures, for example, failure to detect them, would very
likely result in vehicle loss.
b. Actual risk during the Arctic campaign
The simplest way to compare two groups of survival
data is to plot the corresponding survival distributions
on the same axes. However, in this case, it would not
support our analysis because we must take into account
the effect of the monitoring distance, and this is not
explicit in the survival plot. Thus, here, our comparisons
are based on single-point observations.
Similarly to our previous analysis the data consist of
fault assessments and distances of missions with no
faults at all (missions 53 and 55). The experts’ judgments
(Table 4) form the basis for the extended Kaplan–Meier
survival plot (Fig. 3). Having derived this distribution,
the probability of survival based on the actual Arctic
missions can be calculated and compared to the a priori–
estimated risk based on trials data. The differences
TABLE 4. Aggregated risk assessments for the 17 faults that emerged during the arctic campaign. No faults emerged during missions 53
and 55. Faults and their assessments are presented in the order that they were assessed by the expert panel. The two successful fault free
missions were added at the end of the table.
Fault Mission L LQ M UQ U Distance (km) 95% quantile
1 — 0 1.0 3 1027 1.00 3 1026 1.00 3 1025 0.0001 0 4.48 3 1025
2 — 0.000 01 5.00 3 1025 0.0001 0.0005 0.005 0 0.00106
3 — 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 — 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1 0 0.977
5 51 0 0 0 0 0 1.35 0
6 51 0.001 0.005 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.09 0.0933
7 52 0.0001 0.0009 0.003 0.009 0.05 32.4 0.0209
8 52 3.00 3 1026 6.00 3 1025 0.000 16 0.0008 0.01 48.6 0.001 98
9 — 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0009 0.01 0 0.001 70
10 — 5.00 3 1026 1.00 3 1025 0.0005 0.001 0.008 0 0.004 22
11 — 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 — 1.00 3 1027 2.00 3 1027 7.00 3 1027 2.00 3 1026 1.00 3 1025 0 4.13 3 1026
13 — 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 — 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 — 1.00 3 1027 2.00 3 1027 7.00 3 1027 2.00 3 1026 1.00 3 1025 0 4.13 3 1026
16 56 2.50 3 1025 0.000 25 0.0025 0.0125 0.025 324.45 0.0225
17 54 0.001 0.01 0.04 0.082 0.1 334.8 0.0964
53 0 0 0 0 0 131.22 0
55 0 0 0 0 0 325.98 0
FIG. 3. Kaplan–Meier probability of survival for the AUV based
on actual faults and incidents that occurred during the April 2010
Arctic campaign. This should be compared with the distribution for
the a priori dataset, including the effect of mitigation effectiveness
in Fig. 2b.
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between the a priori–estimated and the campaign risk
are presented in Table 5. Results show that the maxi-
mum error between the estimated a priori risk after
mitigation effectiveness was taken into account and the
campaign risk was 10%. Both of the risk profiles against
mission distance, a priori umitigated (Fig. 2b) and ob-
served (Fig. 3), show an approximately 10% reduction in
the probability of survival near the maximum distance. It
is important to note that these are independent datasets,
based on the trials and the Arctic mission datasets, re-
spectively. Consequently, the mission distances are not
the same, and as steps in the Kaplan–Meier plots take
place at the mission distances, it is only to be expected
that there can be instances where the difference between
the two risk profiles may be sensitive to small differences
in mission distance. This becomes more pronounced at
the longer distances, where there have been fewer mis-
sions and the denominator ni in Eq. (2) is therefore small.
For the a priori, mitigated profile, the 10% risk reduction
takes place at 324 km, whereas for the observed risk the
10% step takes place at 334.5 km, resulting in the 10%
difference. The minimum error was 0.9%. The differences
between the a priori unmitigated risk of loss and the cam-
paign riskwere far greater. This emphasizes the importance
of taking mitigation into account when projecting forward
risk based on trials results when a period of addressing and
correcting faults occurs prior to the actual deployment,
otherwise the campaign risk may be overestimated.
9. Discussion and conclusions
This paper addresses a key issue in any critical system
deployment, which is how to quantify the operational risk
when deploying a system in hazardous environments.
Marine and atmospheric scientists attempt to address
these questions prior to the deployment of any critical
system. This assessment is generally based on engineering
judgment and in some cases may be informed by failure
statistics. Good practice is to use formal methods to elicit
the necessary judgments, allowing the process to be trans-
parent, capable of replication, and minimize bias that can
be consciously or subconsciously introduced by experts.
Previous use of formal judgment elicitation for AUV risk
assessment applied mathematical methods to aggregate
the expert judgments into a single judgment. However, as
discussed in this paper and in the referenced work, math-
ematical methods allow bias to be introduced. Behavioral
expert judgment elicitation encourages experts to discuss
and then agree on the risk assessment resulting in a more
informed assessment from the group. The method pre-
sented in this paper captures the experts’ judgment in a
probability distribution. The agreed expert judgment dis-
tributions are unimodal, but can take a number of shapes
reflecting the arguments that underpin them. The benefit
of obtaining a distribution rather than a single-point as-
sessment is that we canmeasure the confidence in the risk
estimation. Subsequence assessments can be carried out
based on the 95% quantile rather than the mean.
After finding a fault one cannot assume that the mit-
igation action will be completely effective and that the
fault will be completely removed from the system. This
will depend on a number of factors, such as fault un-
derstanding and the intensity and efficacy of testing.
Using expert judgment to capture the confidence that
the mitigation plan would completely remove the fault
has been shown to provide realistic updates of the ini-
tial risk estimate.
Validating risk models has always been a concern for
any system developer and user. This is particular true for
systems where a catastrophic event does not occur during
its lifetime. In conventional systems engineering, valida-
tion comprises comparing the model estimates against
results obtained from field testing. Although risk models
are based on expert judgments, a similar rationale ap-
plies. Having conducted two workshops, the first prior to
anArctic deployment (covering 51 faults) and the second
after the deployment (covering 17 faults), the maximum
difference in risk estimates was 10%, indicating an ac-
ceptable level of repeatability and demonstrating that the
a priori estimate was a good predictor of near-term risk
during actual operations after accounting for the effec-
tiveness of mitigation.
TABLE 5. Estimated operational risk for six missions. Numbers are approximated to the third most significant figure.
Probability of loss
No. Objective Distance (km) Unmitigated Mitigated
Mitigated 1 30.51 km
monitoring as mitigated
Observed
risk Difference
51 Monitoring distance 3 0.173 0.090 — 0.072
52 Test mission 1 55 0.278 0.140 0.040 0.077 0.037
53 Test mission 2 131 0.296 0.144 0.005 33 0.077 0.0717
54 Survey mission 1 336 0.500 0.260 0.181 0.172 0.009
55 Survey mission 2 326 0.481 0.259 0.180 0.083 0.097
56 Survey mission 3 324 0.296 0.144 0.054 0.077 0.023
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APPENDIX
The Behavioral Elicitation Process
The judgment elicitation took place in two separate
workshops, the first held inHalifax, Nova Scotia, Canada,
from 8 to 10 December 2009, and the second was held in
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, from 21 to 23 July
2011. The assessments provided on the second workshop
were used to validate the assessments provided in the
first.
a. Expert selection
A preelicitation meeting was organized by the project
stakeholders and the facilitators. The aim was to define
the scope of the elicitation exercise, to select experts,
and to set out the seed questions that would be used to
familiarize the experts with subjective probability. Ex-
perts were selected based on their experience in AUV
operations, with an emphasis on the ISE Explorer ve-
hicle, but also with a wider representation to provide
another perspective. The experts for the first workshop
were as follows:
1) Chris Kaminski, from the International Submarine
Engineering in Canada: With 18 yr of experience in
AUVs, he was part of the Theseus AUV team and
had spent three seasons in the Arctic.
2) Jean-Marc la Framboise, from the International
Submarine Engineering in Canada. Currently an
AUV program manager, he had been involved in
AUV development since 1982, working as project
manager for 10 AUV development programs. His
background is in electrical engineering.
3) Jan Opderbecke, from the Institut Franc¸ais de
Recherche pour l’Exploitation de laMer (IFREMER)
in France: He serves as the programmanager for a fleet
of Explorer AUVs.
4) Jeff Williams, from the University of Southern
Mississippi: He is an operations engineer with a
background in mechanical, electrical, and software
engineering, and has operational experience of an
Explorer AUV.
5) Steve McPhail, from the National Oceanography
Centre in the United Kingdom. He has 22 yr of AUV
experience, designing, building, and operating the
Autosub family of vehicles.
For the second workshop Jeff Williams was unavailable,
and was substituted by Richard Pedersen from the De-
fense Research and Development of Canada. He was fa-
miliar with the elicitation process, because he was one of
the observers in the first risk assessment exercise and had
experience as a project manager of AUV campaigns.
b. Preelicitation briefing
The preelicitation briefing note was distributed to
experts. The document contained five papers providing
an introduction into the elicitationmethod and details of
the SHELF package and supporting literature; the
background information for the elicitation; a list of at-
tendees, experts, and all other stakeholders; the sched-
ule for the workshop; extracts of bathymetric charts and
example ice coverage charts relevant to the study.
c. Training the experts
In previous studies seed variables have been used to
1) measure expert performance,
2) enable performance-based weighted combination of
experts’ distributions, and
3) evaluate, and to an extent validate, the aggregated
output.
Points 2 and 3 remain controversial; the best way to
combine expert judgment based on howwell they perform
in seed questions is not settled (Cooke and Goossens
2004). In this study two seed questions were used to train
experts and make them aware of the fallacies of expert
judgment assessments. The first question was, ‘‘What is
the probability of losing an AUV in an under ice shelf
mission of .10 km?’’; the second question was, ‘‘What is
the probability of an AUV abort during missions under
sea ice?’’ The facilitators knew the answers to the seed
questions from frequentist statistics, not from judgment.
These real facts allowed the facilitators to check that the
experts’ judgments were realistic. Figure A1 presents the
assessment for the two seed questions. The agreedmedian
for question 1 at 0.064was lower than the actual frequency
of loss of 0.22, because two AUVs have been lost in nine
missions under shelf ice. The 95% quantile of the agreed
distribution was 0.35 above the actual frequency of loss;
thus, at the 95% level of confidence that the actual
probability of loss would not be above the estimate from
the experts, their view agreed with actual loss statistics
to date.
d. Eliciting the five parameters of a probability
distribution
First, the plausible range was established by reaching
agreement collectively through discussion on the lower
and upper bounds such that it was extremely unlikely,
but not necessarily impossible, that the probability of
the fault leading to a loss in the described environment
lay outside these bounds. Second, each expert working
alone, without discussion, estimated the median and
then the lower and upper quartiles. After discussion of
the distributions arrived at individually by the experts,
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and sharing of knowledge and reasoning about the dif-
ferences, the experts reached consensus values for the
median and quartiles.
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